lead a fairly full life. The treatment is not, however, a bed of roses. It calls for considerable self-discipline in terms of diet and personal behaviour, travel and movement are obviously limited by the need to be close to the machine and nausea, discomfort and depression grow as the effects of the last treatment wane. Because of these demands, some patients are judged unsuitable for psychological reasons, for example, if they are irresponsible in matters of diet or in other relevant respects. Other patients are not recommended for dialysis for various medical reasons having to do with their physicial health. Thus, it is only a proportion of those dying of renal failure who could benefit from dialysis. The number who do in fact benefit from it is even further reduced by the chronic shortage of machines. They are of course very expensive, costing around £6000 each to which a further C3000 per machine per annum must be added to take account of training staff to use them, nursing and medical care and maintenance, and, of course, it is a long-term financial commitment.
It is a sad and some would say scandalous reality that the National Health Service has not attached the necessary priority to this demand so as to allocate all the money needed to meet the demand in full. At most, only about seven hundred people each year begin dialysis. This has forced doctors into the invidious and to them wholly unwelcome role of having to choose between patients in order to decide which one shall have dialysis, in the knowledge that a decision against a patient is a sentence of death.' To some extent this may be a decision based on medical criteria but there is no doubt that other factors intrude, so that the question has been raised many times whether it is appropriate to leave such a decision to doctors alone.
The other form of treatment for those with renal failure has been available on a regular basis since about I967. This is the kidney transplant. A kidney is taken from a dead person and transplanted into the donee. Less often, kidneys are taken from living donors but I shall not consider the separate, complex issues concerned with live donors here.' If the operation is a success the patient is restored to normal good health. However, transplants should not be seen, as direct alternatives to dialysis. Often a patient must wait for some time on dialysis before transplant is available, sometimes the new kidney fails and the patient will be returned to dialysis possibly to await a second transplant, and for some a transplant is not an available option for medical reasons. Thus, transplantation surgery has not replaced, nor could it do without, dialysis. But, at the same time, it offers a far more attractive longterm solution in every respect, whether from the point of view of the individual patient's general health or the comparative costs involved. It is transplantation surgery and the law governing it that I shall concentrate on in this paper.
The law on transplantaton of kidneys Let me begin by mentioning that it cannot any longer be argued that kidney transplantation surgery is an experimental procedure and therefore to be considered in the light of the special legal r6gime governmg experiments. Certainly, there is some surgery which is experimental. Indeed, heart transplants may still be regarded as such. Kidney transplants, however, have passed this point. At the same time, it should be said that the surgery itself is only part (some might say the easiest part) of the treatment. Complicated tissue-matching must be done to ensure the most favourable possible compatibility between donor and donee, elaborate procedures to ensure a sterile environment after the operation must be organised and a regime of immuno-suppressive drugs must be managed by experts who are qualified to guide the patient between the twin evils of rejection and oversusceptibility to infection. Thus, although the surgery is not experimental, it is such a demanding therapeutic process that it may only be carried out, in my view, where the procedures I have mentioned can be properly and competently undertaken. If this were not possible, to transplant a kidney would be to expose a patient to an unacceptable risk and would, in my view, attract legal liability if damage ensued. Though in the UK this is a somewhat academic point since transplantation is carried out only in designated centres, it could be important if, for example, through National Health Service cut-backs or inadequacies or whatever, such a centre was no longer able to meet the high standards required, but nonetheless continued to carry out transplants.
Turning now to the law, for obvious reasons the common law has nothing to say on the proper regulation of such a modern exercise as organ transplantation. As long ago as I832 there was passed the Anatomy Act which regulated the use of cadavers for medical research and dissection in schools of anatomy. It thereby facilitated the trainig of medical students in anatomy. It did not, however, provide for the donation and subsequent removal of parts of the body for transpltation. Long after the discovery that corneas taken from the eyes of dead bodies could successfully be grafted onto the eyes of patients afflicted, for example, with intractable ulcers, Parlianent belatedly passed in I952 the Corneal Grafting Act. This was the first statute to deal directly with the transplantation of tissue. In 1954 the first human kidney transplant was carried out in Massachussetts. It soon became clear that a new law dealing generally with transplantation was called for if such operations were to be performed in the UK. Parliament responded in I96I with the Human Tissue Act, repealing the Corneal Grafting Act and making provision generally for the removal of tissue from cadavers for transplantation without reference to any specific tissue or organ. Despite the fact that it was passed while transplantation surgery was very much in its infancy, despite the criticism levelled at it and despite numerous attempts to amend or repeal it, the Human Tissue Act is still the only law there is.
Criticism ofthe Act The criticisms made of the Act are basically of two kinds. The first concerns the obscurity of its principal provisions and difficulties of meaning and interpretation.3 The second relates to the political and social premise upon which the Act is based; the notion that tissue should not be taken from a cadaver if either the deceased in his lifetime or his spouse or relatives after his death have objected to its removal. I am more concerned here to draw attention to this second criticism. Let me, in passing, point to some of the problems arising from the language used in the Act, always remembering, of course, that these problems are themselves, in part at least, the product of differing views as to the proper scope and aim ofthe Act.
INTERPRETATION
It will help if Ifirst set out Section i, subsections i and 2. S I (i) If any person either in writing at any time or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness has expressed a request that his body or any specified part of his body be used after his death for therapeutic purposes..., the person lawfully in possession of his body after his death may, unless he has reason to believe that the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorise the removal from the body ofany part or, as the case may be, the specified part, for use in accordance with the request. S i (2) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the person lawfully in possession ofthe body of a deceased person may authorise the removal of any part from the body for use for the said purposes if, having made such reasonable inquiry as may be practicable, he has no reason to believe a) that the deceased had expressed an objection to his body being so dealt with after his death, and had not withdrawn it: or b) that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being so dealt spouse and/or relatives be required if the deceased with.
had not objected but had not consented. The first sub-section provides for what has become known as 'contracting-in', whereby the deceased may express his wish that his kidneys be used for transplanting. The second sub-section provides for the circumstance in which the deceased has not expressed any wish. It would not be an exaggeration to say that some of the words and expressions used have virtually defied all efforts at clarification. A full treatment of these problems of interpretation is inappropriate here.' Two obvious examples are, who is 'the person lawfully in possession of the body' of the deceased and what does 'having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable' really amount to. There are also other problems which have bedevilled commentators, such as whether Donor Cards carried by motorists and others in fact have any legal force, on which even the Department of Health and Social Security took a contradictory stance, saying in I973 that they did not but in I975 that they did. For a long time too, of course, the vexed issue of the legal definition of death, crucial to the question when kidneys may be removed was a major medico-legal preoccupation, since to be of use a kidney must be removed within half-an-hour, or an hour at most, after death.
THE POLICY OF THE ACT
Once the political decision was taken that the removal of kidneys for transplantation was to be encouraged and facilitated, Parliament had to decide how to act. In particular, consideration had to be given to what opposition there was to the removal of kidneys and what (if any) weight should be given to the interests of this opposition. It is often represented that there existed for Parliament two alternatives; the policies of contracting-in, whereby kidneys are removed only from those who have requested this during their life time, and contracting-out, whereby kidneys may be removed from all except those who before death indicate their objection. In fact, a spectrum of options existed for Parliament: I) That doctors on behalf of the National Health Service should have the right to salvage all kidneys deemed suitable, regardless of consent, objection or opposition (subject only to Coronial veto).
2) The other end of the spectrum -that kidneys be removed only if the prior consent of the deceased and his spouse and relatives has been obtained. 3) A modification of i -that kidneys be removed unless the deceased has indicated during his lifetime his objection. 4) A modification of 2 -that only the prior consent of the deceased be required. 5) A modification of 3 and 4 -that as regards 3, the spouse and relatives should have the right to object and/or that as regards 4, that the consent of the It was self-evident that the policy adopted by Parliament would have a crucial effect on the future of transplantation. If the most far-reaching scheme of contracting-out were adopted, very many kidneys would become available each year, doubtless more than the number needed. If, however, the most limited form of contracting-in, with wide scope for objections, were enacted, kidney transplantation as a viable alternative treatment would be in danger of failing for want of kidneys. The scheme which Parliament eventually adopted in the Human Tissue Act is a perfect example of political compromise. Various interests received the protection they sought. The only casualty, the committed observer may remark, is transplantation surgery itself, for there can be on doubt that, quite apart from difficulties of interpretation and other factors, the policy of the Act represents a less than energetic endorsement of transplantation.
What are the competing interests ? There are at least five. First, there is the deceased, should he have a say in the disposal of his body ?; second, the spouse and relatives, should, for example, their views prevail even as against the deceased if they oppose donation while he has requested it?; third, the potential donee, dying at an early age while the kidney which could save him is being buried or cremated; fourth, certain groups who have strongly held views on how the body of a deceased should be treated; and fifth, society at large which must bear the economic and emotional burden of 2000 people each year contracting fatal kidney disease and the cost of dialysis as an expensive alternative to transplantation, and yet must seek to respect the views of religious groups and others so as to avoid the 'tyranny of the majority. ' What Parliament decided on was a two-tier approach. First, there was S i (i), a contracting-in scheme, whereby the deceased's request, if expressed and expressed in the correct form, prevails, subject of course to the fact that it may be withdrawn and that the ultimate discretion lies with the person lawfully in possession. The second tier in Si (2) covers the circumstances in which the deceased has not made a request. In this case, Parliament seems to have opted for a contracting-out scheme, that the kidneys could be taken unless there were objections, but subject to two reservations. The first is the power of the spouse or relatives to object. The other is that Parliament, in considering on whom to place the burden of recording objection, chose to place it on the hospital authority (if it be judged the 'person lawfully in possession') rather than the relative. Thus, it becomes contracting-out with very wide limitations.
It is possible, then, to put in order the priorities respected by Parliament. First, there is the i6 Ian Kennedy deceased's expressed view. Then, the spouse and relatives, in the absence of a view expressed by the deceased, have a power of veto. The existence of a veto also means that groups opposed to taking organs from the dead have succeeded in safeguarding their particular views. The dying and society at large play very much third fiddle in having their interests and needs satisfied, a rather surprising result when the stated aim of the Act in the long title was to 'make provision with respect to the use of parts of bodies of deceased persons for therapeutic purposes.' AN IRONY After taking so much trouble to strike what it conceived to be the right balance in the Act, Parliament then did something very strange. It failed to provide for any sanctions if the provisions of the Act were ignored! The irony is compounded in that, as I will seek to show, were it not for the policy of the Act, not to mention the difficulties of interpretation, a sufficient supply of kidneys could be obtained. So, what is to stop doctors and hospital authorities ignoring the Act which they feel bound reluctantly to observe every day? At least two reasons come to mind.6 First, it may be that a sanction does exist for non-observance, even though the reasoning required to discover it is tortuous at best. The assumption on the part of hospitals and doctors that, since it is a statute, the Act must be complied with, coupled with the fact that some sort of legal liability for non-compliance could be conjured up, persuade them to observe it, out of a sense of erring on the side of caution if nothing else. Second, whatever the law, it is probably the case that it is good, indeed required, ethical conduct to observe the Act, so that nonobservance would invite professional sanction. Notwithstanding this, it is the greatest irony that practically all those who have for so long criticised the Act and pressed for its reform have concentrated on its alleged faults and overlooked the potentially fatal flaw that it may be unenforceable.
KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION -THE REALITY More than 6ooo people are killed in the UK each year in road accidents. From these (and I do not include the additional 2-3000 who die each year from strokes and cerebral tumour), more than enough kidneys could be salvaged for transplantation, (though of course, by no means all of these 6ooo will be placed on respirators.) Of the 2ooo who annually fall victim to fatal kidney failure most could benefit from a transplant. Amazingly, in I977 in the UK only 706 transplantation operations were carried out and this figure represents a massive improvement of more than 22 per cent on the 1976 figure. In I969 there were 200, in I970, 274, in 1971, 315 and in 1973, 465 . Why are so few transplants carried out? Before I try to answer this, let me recall other relevant facts so that a considered judgement may be made. Renal dialysis, the alternative therapy is very expensive, and being long-term treatment, the financial commitment is recurrent and growing. For this and other reasons there has always been a chronic shortage of machines. Under the terms ofthe Finance Act, I978, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security has indicated he will allocate k3i million of the Health Service's promised additional £k8 million for the purchase of 400 extra machines and for associated costs.6 This is both an admission ofthe existing shortage and by all accounts a less than adequate response to it. For, on average, only 65o-7oo patients begin dialysis each year. Thus, until the new machines are in service the maximum number treated by both dialysis or transplant is approximately I440 in 1977. The figure for previous years has been much lower and even with the proposed new machines will only be i8oo at the very most. Thus, at present there are at least 6oo people each year who contract kidney disease and who are told they are going to die because no treatment is available. This is so notwithstanding the fact that we, as a society, are burying several thousand healthy kidneys each year and that a mere C3-5 million (a comparatively insignificant figure in national terms) would provide all the dialysis machines we need. Finally, it is not the case here, as it may be in other areas, that there is not the specialised staff available in National Health Service hospitals to deal with treatment if all were to be offered dialysis or transplantation. On the contrary, the fact is that even in these days of financial stringency in the National Health Service, not one of the 40-odd units set up throughout the country to deal with dialysis, nor any of the transplant teams, is working to its full capacity. In other words, doctors are under-used and patients are dying through lack of machines, lack of kidneys and lack of political will to do anything about it.
But, is there any link between the Human Tissue Act and the lack of kidneys? I will suggest, in company with most There is a rather bleak postscript to the point that the need for urgent action tends to conflict with consideration for the feelings of a spouse or relatives and the need to comply with what is seen to be the meaning of the Act. The quality of the kidneys obtained has often been poor. Problems do not arise if a donor is on a respirator as the machine can facilitate the continued supply of oxygenated blood after death. But many donors have in the past been taken off respirators, the doctor preferring the old notion of death -the absence of heart-beat -to the notion of brain-stem death. The sad and even shocking fact is that in I975 for example as many as I7-3 per cent of all kidneys transplanted never functioned at all because, in the time taken to remove them, they had already become irretrievably damaged. The The adverse publicity mentioned earlier may also have had the further effect of dissuading people from donating their kidneys for transplantation under S i (I).
Reform of the law It does not necessarily follow from what has been said that the law should be changed. Some could argue that while it is accepted that not enough kidneys are becoming available under the existing statutory scheme, this is an unfortunate but inevitable price to be paid for giving proper weight to all competing interests. Others, however, would argue that if we have a law, the purpose of which is to facilitate transplantation, it makes no sense at all for hulldreds to die unnecessarily each year. Of these two positions, I confess I find the second more persuasive. Thus, in this final section, I shall consider various ways in which the law may be reformed. Perhaps I should mention that the I cannot, of course, list every argument which has been put forward. I will, however, mention briefly what I consider to be the most important ones. I) Retain the existing law, with increased publicity, etc.:
Those who argue that the existing law strikes a proper balance between the needs of the potential donee and the feelings of the deceased, his spouse and relatives urge that it should not be changed. What they propose instead is that greater advantage be taken of S i (i), on the basis that if it were sufficiently well-known, enough requests would be made to meet the annual need for kidneys. First, they accept and endorse the Departmental view announced by Mrs Castle that Donor Cards do meet the Act's requirements and urge a far more extensive use of them and variations on the theme of cards. For example, the proposal has been made that applications for driving licences should contain a question concerning willingness to be a kidney donor. If the applicant consented, this information could then be stored in a data bank to which hospitals could have immediate access. Another proposal has been that a tattoo could be used, put, of course, on a hidden but convenient part of the body (the inside of the lip has been suggested). Of course, the problem immediately arises of how someone once tattoed is to change his mind, quite apart from the other weaknesses of this idea, that, for example, it is painful, may be unsightly, certain 
2) Amend the Act
The most recent and well-known examination of kidney donation was a Report published in I975 by a Committee of the British Transplantation Society, called 'The Shortage of Organs for Clinical Transplantation.' 4 A number of recommendations were made. The principal proposal, and one echoed by others, was for the Act to be amended in particular details. The aim appears to have been two-fold; first, to retain the underlying policy of the Act, i.e. contracting-in, S i (i), contracting-out with limitations, S I (2), while, secondly, so to redraft these two subsections as to remove existing uncertainites, thereby facilitating a greater supply of kidneys. In particular, a new form for S I (2) was proposed, and an interpretation section for S i (i) and (2). In the proposed interpretation section it is made explicit that the hospital authority is the person lawfully in possession of a body lying in a hospital, at least until such a time as someone with a greater claim demands it. It also provides that printed Donor Cards or other such documents are 'in writing' for the purpose of S i (i).
The revision of S I (2) The donation and transplantation of kidneys: should the law be changed? I9 part from the body for use for the said purposes if, having made such inquiry as is both reasonable and practicable in the time available, he has no reason to believe that the deceased had expressed an objection (which he was not known to have withdrawn) to his body being so dealt with after his death.
Provided that authorisation shall not be given under this subsection if the person lawfully in possession of the body has reason to believe that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being so dealt with.
The Committee note that only 'in one respect' is any change made in the existing law: that, by the new S I (2), the person lawfully in possession 'would no longer be under a duty to make enquires' as to whether a spouse or relative objected to removal. For, the proviso to the proposed S I (2) merely refers to having reason to believe without the requirement of an obligation to enquire. This has to be understood, however, in the light of the proposed definition of 'the time available' in the interpretation section, as meaning only that period of time 'until the moment at which steps must be taken to remove the part of the body, if it is to be suitable for the therapeutic... purpose'. It is my view that the Committee somewhat understates the significance of their proposal. It may alter the law only in one respect, but, on one reading of the proposal, that respect involves a virtual abandonment of the central thesis of the Act (which the Committee claims to accept), the spouse's or relatives' power of veto. For, if it is conceded that, optimally, kidneys should be removed as soon as death is pronounced, 'the time available' may, by reference to the interpretation section, be made to mean a mere matter of seconds or minutes. Given that no obligation is cast upon the hospital authority to discover objections, unless a spouse or relative is both aware that death is imminent and is on the spot when it takes place, he may be presented with afait accompli; that the kidney has been removed. Admittedly, the Committee argue that the doctor would 'invariably approach the closest available relatives', but he is not required to do so. Thus, the Committee's recommendations are far from satisfactory, in that they either provide for one course of conduct while recommending another, thereby writing uncertainty back into the Act, or they provide for a radical shift of policy towards what is capable of being almost a full-scale contracting out scheme, though masquerading as maintaining the existing policy. If the Committee had thought contracting-out, though the right approach, was politically unlikely to be adopted, then they should, perhaps, have said so and confronted the issue more openly.
3) 
4) Contracting-out
As was seen at the outset, a spectrum of choices was and is available to Parliament as to whose interest should weigh most heavily in any law governing transplants. In the light of the past ten or so years of kidney transplantation, it can be concluded that the present mixture of voluntary contracting-in and contracting-out subject to veto has weighted the scales heavily against those dying of kidney failure. Partial reforms such as giving the spouse or relatives less power may be the answer. Indeed, the Australian Report, after some equivocating, opts for this. My view is that if we really care about helping those afflicted by kidney disease, who it will be recalled are often young people and have so much to offer, then piecemeal, bitty reforms should be seen for the partial solutions they are and abandoned. Instead, Parliament should take the positive step of introducing a pure contracting-out system. Even this does not go far enough for some, since it gives the deceased a power of veto, by registering his objection before death, whereas they would advocate removal regardless of anyone's wishes. Donald Longmore put it strikingly, as follows: 'We can either preserve the ancient laws that guarantee the inviolability of the dead, and the present rights of the next-of-kin, or we can rewrite those laws in favour ofthe living'.12
That Parliament has not introduced contractingout despite considerable pressure over ten years should suggest that powerful arguments exist against it. But, it is not clear what these arguments are. Nonetheless, the past ten years show a record of complete failure of any attempt to change the law. In I968 Sir Gerald Nabarro introduced a Bill providing for the removal of kidneys unless the deceased had during his life indicated his opposition.
The Bill failed in 1968 and again in I969, the Government of the day opposing it on the rather spurious ground that it dealt only with kidneys whereas any law should deal generally with all transplants. In I969 the Government's own Advisory Group"3 set up to consider the working of the Act recommended, albeit by a bare majority, contracting-out but its views were completely ignored. It is true that a British Medical Association Committee in 1970 advised against contracting-out but, in part, their opposition was the product of a general antipathy to transplantation at the time, created by the failures of various heart transplants, which, of course, had nothing to do with kidney transplants. The Bar Council in its Report'4 in I97I was also against contracting-out, principally as it invaded the rights of the individual, but this is patently question-begging, as it depends on which individual is considered, the deceased, his spouse or relative, or the dying patient. On nine occasions culminating in his Transplantation of Organs Bill in I974, Tam Dalyell, MP, has sought to introduce the system of contracting-out, each time to be met with no support from the Government. Finally, the Report of the British Transplantation Society4 I referred to earlier certainly edges towards contracting out but failed to provoke any response from the Government, despite the distinction of the members who wrote it.
I ask again, why have successive Governments not changed one word of the I96I Act? I can find no satisfactory answer save the exertion of pressure by those who claim they are safeguarding freedom, and a wholly unjustified timouressness on the part of the Department of Health and Social Security concerning public opposition, which, if the views of those involved in the area are to be trusted, is completely unfounded, since the consensus of informed opinion is that the vast majority of the public do not share the misgivings attributed to them by the Government and Parliament.
Mahoney,'5 in a careful examination of contracting-out, presents a number of ethical objections. He reaches the conclusion that voluntary service is better in such matters than conscription because of what it says about the society and the respect given to differing viewpoints. Voluntary donation, he says, may be less efficient but is more humane. Again, the question is begged, since I imagine that Mahoney would also at the same time denythat it is humlane to stand by andlet hundreds of people die each year, when their lives could be saved.
Certainly, there can be no argument against contracting-out based on cost, as it is obvious that as between dialysis and transplant, the latter is much cheaper. Finally, there is no lack of examples in other countries of contracting-out laws. France, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway and Israel all have contracting-out.'e Indeed, while somewhat perversely recommending a scheme like group.bmj.com on May 1, 2017 -Published by http://jme.bmj.com/ Downloaded from the Human Tissue Act, the Australian Report inclined to the view that contracting-out would be the accepted model within five years.
If the Department of Health and Social Security does not in its proposed consultation document, offer a reasoned and compelling argument against contracting-out, the Government should, in my view, be obliged to introduce it as soon as possible. Furthermore, if the Department, with or without reasons, opposes contracting-out, it must quite clearly face the fact that it is condemning many suffering from kidney failure to die for want of resources, given that an adequate number of dialysis machines is not available. Also, given that resources are, as a matter of policy, being restricted, the Department must suggest criteria according to which these scarce resources should be made available. To leave these harrowing decisions to doctors is grossly unfair. Of course, the Department would not dream of entering that particular lion's den. But, in failing to lay down guidelines, while condoning, through inaction, the circumstances which demand them, the Department and the Government are both callous and less than honest.
